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I. INTRODUCTION
A seasoned real property practitioner once noted,
A severance of the mineral estate may occur as the result of either
a grant or reservation of the minerals, and determining whether a
severance has in fact occurred or its extent may present a
challenge even for the experienced title examiner. The distinc-
tion between a mineral interest and a royalty interest and which
''minerals" are included in either are questions that continue to
plague examining lawyers, and once those questions are an-
swered the lawyer must concern himself with the validity and
duration of the interest.'
While such comment would not long serve as an attention holder for many
practitioners beyond a cocktail grouping of mineral lawyers, to the author
of a deed which has given rise to one of the "plaguing" questions, a way to
avoid curtain calls becomes a priority item. The purpose of this paper is to
provide conveyancers with a sense of items to be considered when clients
desire to convey or reserve interests in minerals, and thereby hopefully
avoid center-stage billing in future case reports.2
If we begin with the proposition that a conveyance of land carries with
it the entire surface and mineral estates unless a contrary intent appearss,
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1. Nance, Title Examination of Fee Lands Including Severed Mineral Interests, ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. FOUNDATION MINERAL TITLE EXAMINATION INSTITUTE 3-1, 3-23 (1977).
2. Although mineral and royalty interests can be created in numerous other ways, such as by
devise, eminent domain, or declaration of trust, the discussion herein will be in terms of conveyances
and reservations. However, the drafting concerns and suggestions herein discussed are applicable to
any instrument which purports to carve out a mineral, royalty or other interest.
3. Voyta v. Clonts, 134 Mont. 156, 162, 328 P.2d 655, 659 (1958).
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then it is our intent to discuss some of the difficulties scriveners have
encountered in expressing such contrary intent and in defining specific
mineral and royalty interests.
Though we will speak of the "creation" of specific interests, it is more
accurate to employ such terms as "severance", "carving out", or "separa-
tion" since all of the rights and interests involved are in existence as part of
the full fee simple title. Yet, whatever term is used to describe the process,
one should be leery of undertaking the drafting of language to accomplish
the same without a clear understanding of the subject matter and the
desired result. Mineral development is a high stakes/high reward en-
deavor. The lawyer can be assured that his or her drafting efforts will be
closely scrutinized in the vent of development activity, and tested by
litigation if uncertainty exists.
II. BASIC PRINCIPLES
A quick review of the basics regarding ownership of minerals is
desirable before embarking upon a discussion of "severed" interests. First,
the Montana Supreme Court has adopted Blackstone's statement that the
owner of the full fee simple title to a parcel of land owns, "downwards,
whatever is in a direct line, between the surface of [the] land and the center
of the earth."'4 Thus, in Montana, the owner of land owns all substances
which underlie the surface, including oil, gas and other minerals.5
"Ownership" is a collection of privileges and rights to use and enjoy
property, including the right to dispose of the same.6 It is well established
that one or more of these rights can be severed from the others and owned,
exercised and transferred as separate and distinct interests. In the same
fashion, the mineral estate "may be segregated in whole or in part from the
rest of the fee simple title," and the various incidents of the mineral estate
in turn, "may be transferred separately."7 Interests carved out of the
mineral estate may be defined and limited in terms of strata, substances,
4. Gas Products Co. v. Rankin, 63 Mont. 372,389,207 P. 993,997 (1922);see also MONT. CODE
ANN. § 70-16-101 (1987) (stating that "[t]he owner of land in fee has the right to the surface and to
everything permanently situated beneath or above it").
5. Gas Products Co., 63 Mont. at 393, 207 P. at 998; Homestake Exploration Corp. v.
Schoregge, 81 Mont. 604,614,264 P. 388,391 (1928). This is the universal rule in the United States as
concerns solid or "hardrock" minerals, with the exception of extralateral rights appurtenant to lode
mining claims, 54 AM. JUR. 2D, Mines and Minerals § 1 (1971). In the oil and gas context, the Montana
approach is referred to as the "ownership-in-place" theory. McDonald v. Unirex, Inc., -Mont.
_ ,718 P.2d 316,317 (1986). Some states have adopted a "nonownership" theory. I M. WILLIAMS
& C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 203 (1986).
6. In re Hunter's Estate, 125 Mont. 315,324,236, P.2d 94,99 (1951);see also Energy Oils, Inc.,
v. Montana Power Co., 626 F.2d 731, 736 (9th Cir. 1980).
7. Stokes v. Tutvet, 134 Mont. 250, 256, 328 P.2d 1096, 1099-100 (1958).
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duration, manner of use and enjoyment, or all of these." The variety of
interests which can be created is restricted only by the desires and purposes
of the owners, the skill and imagination of their lawyer, and a few rules of
property (such as the rule against perpetuities).
As a final "basic matter", the attitude of the Montana court in
adjudicating conveyancing disputes must be kept in mind. Early in the
history of this state, the court adopted the general rule of law that a
grantor's intent is to be ascertained if possible from an examination of the
document itself.9 For many years, the court was rather consistent in its
application of the rule that the parties' intent was to be garnered from the
four corners of the instrument in question. However, the court recently has
taken to the practice of declaring language ambiguous and resorting to
extrinsic evidence in its efforts to ascertain the intent of the parties. 10 This
ad hoc approach has seemingly now become the rule of choice in
conveyancing cases.1" Thus, if the conveyancer is to have the last word on
the issue (as he or she should), all efforts must be directed to ensuring that
the drafted language can withstand the careful scrutiny which will
accompany mineral development.
III. DEFINITION AND NATURE OF INTERESTS THAT MAY BE
CREATED
The terms most frequently encountered by conveyancers-minerals
and royalty-describe the two basic interests. However, between these
interests are numerous variations and the lines of demarcation are not
always distinct.'"
A. Mineral Interests
The most complete mineral interest is the full mineral fee estate. In
addition to ownership of minerals in place, the mineral estate is comprised
of a number of elements or incidents-the collection of rights, powers and
privileges which make up the estate-enumerated by the Montana court as
follows:
1. The right to go upon the land, conduct exploratory operations,
and produce. . .(the development right). If there is a sub-
sisting. . .[development agreement], this right is subject
8. 1 E. KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 3.1 (1987).
9. Hollensteiner v. Missoula Lumber Co., 37 Mont. 278, 96 P. 420 (1908).
10. Cf. Crawford v. Griffith, 137 Mont. 140,351 P.2d 223 (1960);Adamsv. Chilcott, 182 Mont.
511, 597 P.2d 1140 (1979); Procter v. Werk, -Mont. , 714 P.2d 171 (1986).
11. See Peterson v. Hopkins, -Mont.------, 684 P.2d 1061 (1984).
12. The Montana court has acknowledged that its decisions attempting to distinguish between
mineral and royalty interests are less than clear. Stokes, 134 Mont. at 256-263,328 P.2d at 1100-1103.
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thereto, but may be exercised if and when the... [development
agreement] terminates;
2. The right to execute... [a development agreement] (the
executive right). If there is a subsisting. . .[development agree-
ment] this right is also subject thereto;
3. The right to a share in the bonus under fu-
ture. . .[development agreements];
4. The right to a share in the rentals under existing and
future. . . [development agreements].
5. The right to a share in the royalties under existing and
future. . . [development agreements]."
A critical aspect of the development right is the right to enter upon the
surface of the land and use as much as is reasonably necessary for
exploration, development and production of minerals.14 This right to use
the surface, commonly referred to as the exploration and development
easement, constitutes a burden on the surface estate, and will be implied
when not specifically included in the instrument which severs the mineral
estate from the surface estate. 5 As discussed below, one must keep in mind
that the relationship between the surface and the mineral estates can be
defined within the severance instrument.
The foregoing discussion is applicable to not only full mineral fee
estates, but also to fractional mineral interests. 6
B. Royalty Interest
Unlike mineral interests, a royalty interest is not an ownership interest
in the minerals in place," but rather constitutes a share of production, in
kind or in value, if and when mineral production occurs.' 8 A royalty
interest can be carved out of the mineral estate either before or after
execution of a development agreement, such as an oil and gas lease, or can
be created as an element of consideration for the execution of a mineral
lease.1 9 A royalty created in connection with the issuance of a mineral lease
is normally limited to the duration of the lease, while a royalty interest
13. Stokes, 134 Mont. at 256,328 P.2d at I 100 (quoting R. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF OIL AND
GAS LAW 208 (1955)).
14. Hurley v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., 153 Mont. 199, 202, 455 P.2d 321, 323 (1969).
15. Western Energy Co. v. Genie Land Co., 195 Mont. 202, 208, 635 P.2d 1297, 1301 (1981).
16. A fractional mineral interest is an undivided share of the ownership of the minerals in place
and of the incidents thereof, i.e., a cotenancy interest in the mineral estate. Marias River Syndicate v.
Big West Oil Co., 98 Mont. 254, 265, 38 P.2d 599, 602 (1934); see also Amundson v. Gordon, 134
Mont. 142, 149, 328 P.2d 630, 634 (1958).
17. Rist v. Toole County, 117 Mont. 426, 434-436, 159 P.2d 340, 343-345 (1945); see also
Richardson v. Richland County, -Mont_ 711 P.2d 777, 781 (1985).
18. Voyta, 134 Mont. at 164, 328 P.2d at 660.
19. Stokes, 134 Mont. at 257, 328 P.2d at 1100; see also Proctor, __ Mont. at __ , 714
P.2d at 173.
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carved from the mineral estate without reference to a specific development
agreement is usually referred to as a "perpetual nonparticipating roy-
alty". 20 The term "nonparticipating" has reference to development, and as
such, royalty interests are most commonly a fraction of gross production
free of development costs.21 However, they can be quantified in any
number of ways.22
Aside from the above-stated distinctions between mineral and royalty
interests, the principal economic difference is in the quantity of production
or production proceeds to which each would be entitled upon discovery in
commercial quantities. For example, comparing a 5 per cent mineral
interest with a 5 per cent royalty interest (assuming production under an oil
and gas lease in which a proportionately-reducible 21 12.5 per cent royalty
was reserved), out of every 100 barrels of oil produced the 5 per cent
mineral owner is entitled to only .625 barrels of oil (5 % of 12.5), while the
royalty owner is entitled to 5.0 barrels (5% of 100).21
C. Hybrid Interests
Numerous variations of mineral and royalty interests, carrying genes
of each, can be created. For example, a nonexecutive mineral interest has
royalty characteristics in that is does not include the executive right, and
generally would not include the executive right, and generally would not
include the development right.25 Typically, a nonexecutive mineral interest
20. Edward v. Prince, -Mont._.., 719 P.2d 422, 424 (1986); see also Stokes, 134
Mont. at 258, 328 P.2d at 1101.
21. See, e.g., McSweyn v. Musselshell County, -Mont..., 632 P.2d 1095 (1981).
Although a royalty is usually a share of gross production free of the cost of discovery and production
(Smith v. County of Musselshell, 155 Mont. 376,472 P.2d 878 (1970)), questions arise as to whether
costs of transportation, gathering, processing and treating are chargeable to the royalty owner (West v.
Alpar Resources, Inc., 298 N.W.2d 484 (N.D. 1980)), whether the royalty owner is chargeable with
production-related taxes (Forbes v. Mid-Northern Oil Co., 100 Mont. 10, 45 P.2d 673 (1935)), and
even as to how the amount payable should be calculated (Montana Power Co. v. Kravik, 179 Mont. 87,
586 P.2d 298 (1978)). Although these issues are often not addressed in the instruments creating the
royalty interest, they are certainly candidates for express treatment depending upon the degree of
sophistication appropriate to the transaction.
22. Other than a fraction of gross production, royalties can be measured in terms of a percentage
of net profits, a percentage of net proceeds, a fixed amount per unit of production, an amount based on
contained value, a percentage of net smelter returns, a percentage of value at some intermediated point,
or on any other basis the parties devise. For each stated method of measurement the formula for
calculating the royalty should be set forth in detail, particularly where the method of measurement has
not been established by industry practice and case law. See Henderson, Drafting Mining Agreements:
Royalties and Related Drafting Issues, 3 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 12 (1988).
23. Most oil and gas leases routinely contain a clause intended to relate the stated royalty to the
lessor's mineral ownership.
24. Cloughv. Jackson, 156 Mont. 272,283,479 P.2d 266,272 (197 1);see also Voyta, 134 Mont.
at 164, 328 P.2d at 660.
25. 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 5, § 321. But see Id. § 304.10.
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owner would be entitled to bonuses and rentals, as well as royalties, under
any lease executed by the owner of the executive right. 6 In the production
example set forth above, a 5 per cent nonexecutive mineral interest owner is
entitled to only .625 barrels ofoil27, although such interest might otherwise
be very similar to a royalty interest.
Creatable interests not only may contain indicia of both basic types of
interests, they may also be defined to last in perpetuity or for limited terms
(e.g., fixed terms, life estates, or a specified number of years and so long
thereafter as minerals are produced), and may be restricted to cover only
specified minerals or strata. Yet, in every case the attorney's task is to
advise the client of the options available and devise language which clearly
expresses the client's intent.
IV. LEGAL REQUISITES FOR CREATING MINERAL AND ROYALTY
INTERESTS
As mineral interests constitute real property,28 and royalties are
interests in real property,29 transfers of these interests must satisfy the
usual requirements for a conveyance of real property, i.e., an executed
written instrument, a grantor, a grantee, words of grant, an adequate
description of the property, an acknowledgment for recording purposes,
delivery and acceptance8 0
At common law the various parts of a deed had specific purposes and
limitations, and a clear distinction was made between exceptions and
reservations with rules for the content, usage, effect and placement of each.
However, the Montana court has expressly rejected these technical rules
26. 1 KUNTZ, supra note 8, § 15.3 (referring to the interest as a "nonparticipating mineral
interest").
27. 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 5, § 327.3.
28. Stokes, 134 Mont. at 255, 328 P.2d at 1099; see also Willard v. Federal Surety Co. 91 Mont.
465, 471, 8 P.2d 633, 635 (1932)
29. While royalties do not constitute title to minerals in place, and though there may be some
question as to whether royalties should be classified as real property or personal property, there seems to
be no doubt that royalties will be treated as interests in real property to the extent that rules applicable
to transfers of interests in real property will govern royalty transfers. Compare Rist, 117 Mont. at 432,
159 P.2d at 343-345 (indicating that: (a) a royalty does not constitute title to real property, (b) is an
interest in the personal property produced, and (c) is in the nature of a profit a prendre) with Pluhar v.
Guderjahn, 134 Mont. 46, 51, 328 P.2d 129, 132 (1958) (holding that an assignment of royalty falls
within the definition of a conveyance of real property for purposes of the recording laws), Mitchell v.
Pesta, 123 Mont. 142, 147-48, 208 P.2d 807, 809-10 (1949) (applying an after-acquired title statute
pertaining to real property to a royalty conveyance) and Edward, -Mont. at._, 719 P.2d at
424 (1986) (applying a statute of interpretation applicable to grants of real property to a royalty
transfer).
30. See, e.g., Hodgkiss v. Northland Petroleum Consol, 104 Mont. 328, 332-33, 67 P.2d 811,
813-14 (1937) (necessity of a proper grantee in a mineral deed); see also 3 AM. LAW OF MINING §
82.01(4) (1987).
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and distinctions in favor of a rule which effectuates the parties' intent to the
extent it can be ascertained."1
However, this is not to say that placement of a reservation in a deed is
unimportant. Indeed, placement may be critical in the interpretation of a
conveyance. For example, if exception language is located immediately
following a warranty clause, there is substantial risk that the language will
be viewed by a court as solely an exclusion from the warranty."2
In every conveyance involving mineral or royalty interests, the
conveyancer must ensure that all requirements of a real property transfer
are satisfied. Furthermore, although many technical rules of conveyancing
either have been abandoned or are in the process of being abandoned as the
result of a strong present policy favoring the intent of the parties, vestiges of
the technical rules still remain and may have an impact upon the
interpretation of the conveyance.
The common law rule disfavoring reservations in favor of a stranger to
title is illustrative of the problems created if proper attention is not paid to
developing judicial trends when drafting mineral and royalty reservations.
In recent years, to effectuate the intent of the parties, a number of
jurisdictions have rejected the rule that a reservation cannot be made in
favor of a stranger to title." While the Montana court has not overturned
the rule in the context of mineral or royalty reservations, it has announced
that it "will depart from that rule to give effect to the grantor's intent
[where the intent of the grantor is] clearly shown."3 4
There is little doubt that the Montana court would recognize a
reservation in favor of a stranger where intent is adequately shown.
However, the careful draftsman can completely avoid this question by
using words of grant in favor of the party who is to receive the subject
interest. And, there is no rule which would prevent such a grant from being
included in a deed conveying other interests to another grantee.
As is often the case when a fisherman pulls one worm out of the
tobacco can, he finds a whole ball of worms also seeking to exit. Tugging on
the one worm, rejection of the rule against reservations in favor of
strangers, leads to the problems raised by the common practice of spousal
31. Krutzfeld v. Stevenson, 86 Mont. 463, 474,284 P. 553, 555 (1930) (rejecting the technical
distinctions between the various parts of a deed in order to implement the intent of the grantor); see also
Marias River Syndicate, 98 Mont. at 263-64, 38 P.2d at 601 (disregarding the technical distinction
between exceptions and reservations in order to give effect to the grantor's intent).
32. See, e.g., Mueller v. Strangeland, 340 N.W.2d 450 (N.D. 1983).
33. See Malloy v. Boettcher, 334 N.W.2d 8,9-10, (N.D. 1983); see also Willard v. First Church
of Christ, 7 Cal.3d 473, 498 P.2d 987, 102 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1972).
34. Medhus v. Dutter, 184 Mont. 437, 444, 603 P.2d 669, 673 (1979). In Medhus, the court
found that the showing of intent to create an easement by reservation in favor of a stranger was not
sufficiently clear.
1988]
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joinder in deeds. When a husband or wife conveys his or her separate
property the spouse customarily joins in the deed to release spousal rights,
and the deed often collectively names the two as "grantors" or "first
parties". Frequently, a reservation in such a deed commences with
"reserving to grantors" or "reserving to first parties." Such reference
places the fat in the fire.
As the rule denying effect to reservations in favor of strangers is either
dead or dying in Montana, will such a reservation in the spousal situation
inure to the benefit of the non-owning spouse? A strict reading would
dictate a "yes" response, while a "no" answer finds strong support in the
argument that the reasons for spousal joinder and the common practice of
naming the non-owning spouse as one of the grantors preclude the
reservation language from sufficiently expressing an intent that the
reservation is to benefit the non-owning spouse.35 Howver, the North
Dakota court when faced with this issue held that such a reservation did
inure to the benefit of the non-owing spouse.3 6
The conveyancer should leave no doubt when drafting a deed to be
joined by a non-owning spouse that either, (a) the reservation is not
intended to benefit the non-owning spouse, or (b) by the inclusion of
appropriate words of grant and expressed intent, the reservation is
intended to run in favor of the non-owning spouse.
V. SUBSTANCES COVERED By THE TERM "MINERALS"
Typically, mineral and royalty reservations and conveyances apply to
"oil, gas and other minerals", 87 or "all minerals."3 8 Since the word
"minerals" does not carry a well-defined, well-established meaning, a
practitioner must be concerned with what substances are intended to be
covered when clients request drafting services and advice involving
minerals and royalties. 9 The few Montana cases on point teach that
"minerals" includes oil and gas,40 and may or may not include sand and
gravel depending upon the intent of the parties as shown by extrinsic
35. Id.
36. Malloy, 334 N.W.2d at 8.
37. See, e.g., Broderick v. Stevenson Consolidated Oil Co., 88 Mont. 34, 36, 290 P. 244, 244
(1930).
38. See, e.g., Superior Oil Co. v. Vanderhoof, 307 F.Supp. 84, 85 (D. Mont. 1969).
39. See, Reeves, The Meaning of the Word "Minerals", 54 N.D.L.REv. 419 (1978), reprinted
in 16 PUB. LAND & RESOURCEs L. DIG. 10, 14 (1979); see also Annotation, Grant, Lease, Exception,
or Reservation of "Oil and Gas, and Other Minerals," or the Like, as including Coal or Metallic Ores,
59 A.L.R.3D 1146, 1150 (1974).
40. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. State, 125 Mont. 258, 260,234 P.2d 452,453 (1951); Mid-
Northern Oil Co. v. Walker, 65 Mont. 414,427,211 P. 353,356 (1922); Rice Oil Co. v. Toole County,
86 Mont. 427, 431, 284 P. 145, 146 (1934).
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evidence. 4' Although the Montana court's experience with this issue is
limited, courts from other jurisdictions have repeatedly faced the matter
with inconsistent results.4
Various approaches and criteria have been utilized by the courts in
determining whether a particular substance is included within a reserva-
tion or conveyance of "minerals", with the theoretical goal in each case
that of discerning the intent of the parties.4 Since this intent is not clear
from the language used-indeed, specific intent as to unnamed substances
is probably nonexistent---courts have turned to various rules of construc-
tion.44 Traditional rules of construction which have been utilized include:
the ordinary and natural meaning test;4 5 the ejusdem generis rule
(meaning of general terms restricted by specific words preceding them);46
and the rule by which deeds are construed against the grantor.47 In general,
such rules are not productive of consistent results, often point in opposite
directions, fail in many cases to effectuate intent and fail to take into
account important factors and goals.48
Accordingly, some courts have favored approaches more specifically
designed for the task of ascertaining the meaning of the term "minerals",
utilizing criteria based upon the recognition in the community of a
substance as a mineral,49 the knowledge of the parties as to the presence of
the substance in question,50 economic value apart from the surface itself,5 1
41. Adams v. Chilcott, 182 Mont. 511, 597 P.2d 1140 (1979).
42. For a summary of the cases on this issue, see Reeves, supra note 39. See also Patterson, A
Survey of Problems Associated With Ascertaining The Ownership of "Other Minerals", 25 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 21-I (1979).
43. Patterson, supra note 42, at 21-3.
44. Laue, Interpretation of "Other Minerals" in a Grant or Reservation of a Mineral Interest,
71 CORNELL L.REv. 618 (1986), reprinted in 23 PUB. LAND & RESOURcEs L.DIG. 202, 203-205
(1988).
45. See, e.g., Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex. 1984) (uranium is a
mineral within the ordinary and natural meaning of the word); cf. Mack Oil Co. v. Laurence, 389 P.2d
955, 961 (Okla. 1964) (water not within ordinary meaning of the word).
46. See, e.g., Vogel v. Cobb, 193 Okla. 64, 67, 141 P.2d 276, 280, (1943) (ejusdem generis
applied to hold water is not included in "oil, petroleum, gas, coal, asphalt and all other mineral");
Keeler v. Ely, 192 Kan. 698,701,391 P.2d 132, 135 (1964) (ejusdem generis applied to hold gypsum
included in reservation of "all minerals").
47. See, e.g., Keeler, 192 Kan. at701,391 P.2dat 135; cf. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-1-516 (1987)
which adopts this rule, but provides that a reservation is to be interpreted in favor of the grantor.
48. Lowe, What Substances are Minerals?, 30 ROCKY MTN, MIN. L. INs-T. 2-1,2-6 through 2-
II; see also Laue, supra note 44, at 204-219.
49. See, e.g., Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Strohacker, 202 Ark. 645, 152 S.W.2d 557 (1941 )(oil
and gas not covered by a reservation of"all coal and mineral deposits" because those substances were
not commonly recognized in the area as minerals).
50. See, e.g., Detlor v. Holland, 57 Ohio St. 492, 504,49 N.E. 690,692 (1898) ("other valuable
minerals" did not include oil where neither party knew of its existence).
51. Vang v. Mount, 300 Minn. 393,400,220 N.W.2d 498, 502 (1974) (evidence of the value of
the limestone in question was pertinent as to whether it was included in a reservation of "all minerals").
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and the effect upon the surface estate.5 2 These formulations, although
more in tune with the realities of the issue than traditional rules of
construction, are also unsatisfactory from many viewpoints."
As indicated above, the decisions of the Montana court provide little
guidance in this area. However, Adams v. Chilcott54 suggests the approach
that the court likely may follow in future cases,. The question before the
court was whether sand and gravel are included within a reservation
covering, "oil, gas and mineral rights. ' 55 The court "decline[d] to
announce an applicable rule in Montana . -. 56 It determined that "[t] he
split of authority, the voluminous litigation the issue has caused and the
absence of pertinent Montana case law indicate that the term 'mineral', as
applied to sand and gravel, is inherently ambiguous. 57 Therefore, extrin-
sic evidence of the parties' intent will control the result.58
Thus, it can be argued that in Montana the term "minerals" is
ambiguous with respect to virtually any substance not specifically men-
tioned (except possibly oil and gas)59 . Although making every effort to
ascertain the parties' intent is laudable, to permit extrinsic evidence of the
parties' intent in each case not only creates great uncertainty with respect
to land titles, it also requires that the issue be litigated each time it arises.6 0
The above discussion briefly demonstrates the nature of the problem
and the difficulties that it has posed for the courts. Thus, the draftsman
should, to the extent possible and practical, avoid this quagmire for his
client.
As a practical matter, the parties to the proposed transaction have
probably not formulated a specific intent with respect to the substances to
be covered by the reservation or conveyance, except for a few prevalent in
the vicinity of the property. 1 That is, parties to a mineral or royalty
transaction covering land in eastern Montana very likely have in mind oil,
gas and coal, while their counterparts in a hard-rock mining area are
probably contemplating metalliferous minerals such as gold, silver, and
copper.
As a starting point, the scrivener should inquire as to the specific
52. Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971) (excluding iron ore from a grant of "oil,
gas and other minerals" where the removal of the ore would "consume or deplete the surface estate").
53. Laue, supra note 44, at 204-19; see also Lowe, supra note 48, at 2-6 through 2-11.
54. 182 Mont. 511, 597 P.2d 1140 (1979).
55. Id. at 517, 597 P.2d at 1144.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.; see MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-20-202 (1987).
59. Oil and gas, at least in the usual case, are apparently covered by the term "minerals". See
supra text accompanying note 40.
60. See Laue, supra note 44, at 214-16.
61. Lowe, supra note 48, at 2-3 through 2-5.
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substances the parties to the reservation or conveyance have in mind. With
this information, the possibility of limiting the reservation or conveyance to
the contemplated substances should be explored. This generally will be
consistent with the economics of the transaction, since these normally are
the substances for which the deal has been struck. If this approach is
followed, the language of the reservation or conveyance should be
expanded to include associated substances occurring or produced with the
enumerated substances.
If the parties wish to cover "all minerals", in essence all substances
except the soil itself, the following language may be considered:
"All minerals" as used herein shall include all known and
unknown substances which are now, or may in the future become,
intrinsically valuable, that is, valuable in themselves aside from
their location within the earth, and which are now or may be in
the future enjoyed through extraction from the earth, whether or
not such extraction damages or destroys the surface. 2
The parties must be given the opportunity to exclude from this broad
formulation certain items such as sand, gravel, clays and bentonite, which
are so often considered more a part of the surface estate than the mineral
estate. s Because effects of exploration and development upon the surface
have often influenced the determination of what substances are covered, we
believe explicit treatment must be given this matter as well. Effects of
mineral exploration and development upon the surface will be treated in
greater detail below.
If the parties are more comfortable with a traditional approach, but
they nevertheless wish to cover "all minerals", an expansive statement of
the minerals covered together with express inclusion and exclusion of all
substances actually considered by the parties and an express statement
concerning impact upon the surface should be used. The following
language is recommended:
"All minerals" as used herein shall include every mineral of
whatsoever description, nature of kind, whether known or un-
known, whether occurring in a gaseous, liquid or solid state,
whether metalliferous, nonmetalliferous, hydrocarbon or
nonhydrocarbon, whether similar or dissimilar to the minerals
hereafter enumerated, regardless of the manner of extracting the
same and regardless of whether such extraction damages or
destroys the surface, including but not limited to oil, gas, coal,
gold, silver, nickel, copper, and iron but expressly excluding sand,
gravel, bentonite and clay.
62. Adapted from language suggested by 1 KUNTZ, supra note 8, § 13.3, at 385.
63. As stated by the Montana court in Adams, "extra care should be taken to expressly include
or exclude sand and gravel from the term 'mineral'." 182 Mont. at 517, 597 P.2d at 1144.
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Whether utilizing one of the approaches suggested above or by some other
means, the draftsman must avoid the "inherently ambiguous" nature of
the term "mineral".64
VI. CREATING THE INTEREST INTENDED--MINERAL Vs. ROYALTY
Probably the most litigated issue concerning mineral and royalty
conveyances and reservations is the fundamental question of whether the
language used creates a mineral or royalty interest. Because draftsmen in
the past have had such difficulty with this issue and early case law was
confusing, the resulting precedent now stands as guideposts in Montana
which delineate a route by which this question can be avoided.
As discussed above, whether an interest is a mineral or royalty interest
is of major economic consequence. A royalty owner is entitled to only a
share of production if and when production occurs, while a mineral interest
constitutes ownership of minerals in place and carries with it the develop-
ment and executive rights, and the right to bonuses, rentals and royalties
under any mineral lease. Although a mineral interest includes more
incidents of the mineral estate, a specified fractional interest carries more
economic benefit as a royalty than as a mineral interest from a production
point of view.65
The essential distinction between royalty and mineral interests
provides the framework for ensuring that the intended interest is created.
As stated by the Montana court in Stokes v. Tutvet:
Since "royalty" and "non-participating royalty" are shares in
production only, certain words denoting a share in production
have been used to delimit the interest conveyed. Likewise, a
mineral interest being a severing of the mineral fee is often
described in terms of ownership under the ground. Thus, "pro-
duced and saved" have been associated with royalties, "oil and
gas in and under and upon" the land, have been associated with a
mineral interest. 66
Thus, to create a mineral interest the scrivener should utilize the terminol-
ogy, "in and under and upon", while the creation of a royalty interest is
accomplished by use of "produced and saved", or words of similar import.
Although the language set forth above is of "primary importance" in
making a clear distinction between mineral and royalty interests,67 the
courts have looked at many other factors, most of which are derived from
the nature of the interests. For example, a mineral interest is evidenced by
64. Id.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 12-27.
66. 134 Mont. at 259, 328 P.2d at 1101.
67. Superior Oil Company, 307 F.Supp. at 90;see also Mitchellv. Hannah, 123 Mont. 152, 157,
208 P.2d 812, 814 (1949).
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express inclusion of exploration and development easements, the right to
receive bonuses and rentals, and the development and executive rights."8
Since royalties are generally a cost-free fraction of mineral production, if
and when produced, and since the mineral interest owner (or a lessee) must
incur exploration and development costs to realize a benefit, the Montana
court has stressed the significance of the presence or absence of language
which renders the interest "free and clear of the costs of its discovery and
production."6 9 Such language is recommended in the creation of royalty
interests.
The seminal case of Marias River Syndicate v. Big West Oil Co.70 had
the effect of placing Montana in the minority with respect to the effect of
the use of the term "royalty". In Marias River, the court construed a
reservation to be a mineral despite other indicia of a royalty interest. 1 The
Montana Supreme Court, somewhat reluctantly, has followed this prece-
dent of placing little or no significance on the use of the term "royalty".72
Accordingly, one should not rely on the terms "royalty " or "landowner's
royalty" as sufficient in and of themselves to create a royalty interest.73
Construction problems most often arise when the instrument in
question mixes indicia of both mineral and royalty interest. Indeed, from
our experience and the reported cases there apparantly has been a long-
standing practice in Montana of combining "in, on and under" type
language with "produced and saved", or similar words. 4 Although such a
combination will generally be construed as creating a mineral interest, 75 a
strong possibility exists that such language will be viewed as ambiguous
with the result that extrinsic evidence of intent is admissible to establish a
royalty interest.76 In view of the Montana court's propensity to favor
68. Superior Oil Company, 307 F.Supp. at 90; see also Marias River Syndicate, 98 Mont. at
266-67, 38 P.2d at 602; see also Crawford v. Griffith, 137 Mont. 140, 144, 351 P.2d 223, 225 (1960)
(reservation by the grantors of the right to lease and control of the minerals was indicative that a 100 %
mineral interest had been reserved).
69. Marias River Syndicate, 98 Mont. at 265, 38 P.2d at 601; see also Smith v. County of
Musselshell, 155 Mont. 376, 380, 472 P.2d 878, 881 (1970).
70. 98 Mont. 254, 38 P.2d 599 (1934).
71. Id. at 264, 38 P.2d at 601.
72. Stokes, 134 Mont. at 262,328 P.2d at 1103 (term "landowner's royalty" was not given effect
as creating a royalty interest.)
73. Recent Montana Decisions, 21 MONT. L. REV. 125, 129-31 (1959).
74. See, e.g., Marias River Syndicate, 98 Mont. at 264,38 P.2d at 601; McSweyn, -Mont.
at -, 632 P.2d at 1096 (1981).
75. See, e.g., Marias River Syndicate v. Big West Oil Co., 98 Mont. 254,38 P.2d 599; Smith v.
County of Musselshell, 155 Mont. 376,472 P.2d 878 (1970); Amundson v. Gordon, 134 Mont. 142,
328 P.2d 630 (1958).
76. Superior Oil Company, 307 F.Supp. 84 at 90-91 (extrinsic evidence considered in
determining that, "a reservation of six and one-fourth percent (6 4 %) of all minerals contained in and
hereafter mined, produced, extracted or otherwise taken" created a royalty interest); see MoNT. CODE
ANN. § 70-20-202 (1987).
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admission of extrinsic evidence in the ascertaining of intent 7 even though
such an approach sacrifices certainty of titles, words such as "in, on and
under" should never be combined with words like "produced and saved."
Referring simply to "oil and gas rights" or "mineral rights" tends to have
the effect of creating mineral interests, even though the terms, "in, under
and upon" are not used. 8
However, we believe such "short forms" can be ambiguous in some
circumstances, and caution against relying upon the same. Likewise, we
caution against the use of "all mineral rights" or similar language if the
intent is to convey or reserve all interests pertaining to minerals whether
they be mineral or royalty or both. In this case the language should clearly
indicate that all mineral and royalty interests are conveyed or reserved.
The above analysis assumes the creation of pure mineral or royalty
interests. As discussed earlier, creating hybrid interests with incidents of
both mineral and royalty interests is possible. 9 Where this is the goal of the
parties, careful drafting is essential. In this effort, the terms of art discussed
above are not as useful. To create a hybrid-type interest, the draftsman
must have in mind all the elements of the mineral estate and should
expressly either include or exclude each element. In addition, since the
traditional legal relationships associated with royalty and mineral interests
may not be appropriate or relevant, the draftsman must consider whether
the instrument should expressly set forth these relationships. For example,
where the executive right is severed from a mineral interest, creating a non-
executive mineral interest, it may be wise to delineate the extent of the
executive's obligations to the non-executive mineral owner with respect to
the decision to lease and the amount of bonus, rental and royalties under a
lease.80 A complete and clearly-expressed statement of all the elements of
77. Stokes, 134 Mont. at 263,328 P.2d at 1103 (1958) (reservation held ambiguous based upon
extrinsic evidence, contrary to the usual approach of only considering extrinsic evidence when the
language itself is determined to ambiguous); see also Crawford, 187 Mont. at 144-45, 351 P.2d at 225
(the court announced: "It is the duty of the courts, and the intention of the law, that the intent of the
parties be enforced as far as possible. The tendency of modern decisions is to disregard technicalities
and to treat all uncertainties in a conveyance as ambiguities subject to be cleared up by resort to the
intention of the parties as gathered from the instrument itself, the circumstances attending and leading
up to its execution, and the subject matter and the situation of the parties as of that time"); see also
Recent Montana Decisions, 21 MONT. L. REV. 125, 128-129 (1959).
78. Wyrick v. Hoefle, 136 Mont. 172, 346 P.2d 563 (1959) ("oil and gas rights"); Amundson v.
Gordon, 134 Mont. 142, 328 P.2d 630 (1958) ("mineral rights").
79. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
80. Since there are no Montana cases dealing with a non-executive mineral interest, the creation
of such an interest in Montana should be approached with extreme care. A number of questions beyond
the scope of this article should be considered, including (but not limited to) applicability of the rule
against perpetuities, the duration of the severance of the executive right, whether the executive right is
personal in nature, the obligations of the executive to the non-executive, and the quantum of production
to which the non-executive is entitled. See Bledsoe, Conveyancingof Oil and Gas Interests, 32 OIL AND
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the hybrid interest and the attendant legal relationships should be included
in the instrument of creation.
In summary, creation of a pure mineral interest can be accomplished
by use of the words, "in, on and under", and we suggest that a statement of
exploration and development easements be added as well. A traditional
royalty interest will be created by the language "x per cent royalty of all
minerals produced and saved, free of cost of exploration, development and
production." Words indicative of a mineral interest should never by mixed
with royalty-type words. Shorthand attempts to create a hybrid interest
should be avoided in favor of an express statement of the incidents to be
included and excluded, and of the legal relationships intended. In the
creation of any interest, be it mineral, royalty, or hybrid, the instrument of
creation should be examined in its entirety to insure that it contains nothing
which is inconsistent with the interest intended and nothing which might
create an ambiguity.81
VII. FRACTIONAL INTEREST/QUANTUM OF INTEREST
Fractional interest questions can present difficult and complex
problems for the mineral conveyancer, and a result which may be perfectly
obvious to one person or court may be doubtful to another. In this area, the
best advice is to proceed with extreme caution, double-check all assump-
tions and conclusions, attempt to identify all possible results of the
language used and make clarifying revisions until there can be no doubt as
to the result intended. In this section, we will deal with only a sampling of
the fractional-interest type problems which can arise. Our purpose is to
provide a flavor for the concerns the attorney should keep in mind, without
providing an exhaustive catalog of possible fractional interest issues.
A critical factor in most, if not all, fractional-interest issues is the
status of the grantor's title at the time of the conveyance in question.
Obviously, the scrivener should know with a fair degree of certainty the
status of the grantor's title, but in many cases ascertaining title status may
not be practical or the information available may not be completely
reliable. In these cases, the conveyancer must attempt to draft the
conveyance or reservation such that the desired result is reached under any
one of several reasonably possible title situations.
GAs L. AND TAXATION INST. 83, 91-92 (1981); see also I KuNTz, supra note 8, § 15.7; 2 WILLIAMS &
MEYERS, supra note 5, §§ 321-330.
81. See Musselshell Valley Farming & Livestock Co. V. Cooley, 86 Mont. 276,294,283 P. 213,
218 (1929) (" [e] very intention of the parties to a deed is to be ascertained, if possible, from its language,
not as it is presented in particular sentences or paragraphs, but according to its effect when viewed as in
entirety"); see also Crawford, 137 Mont. at 144-45, 351 P.2d at 225 (in determining the intentions of
the parties, the instrument will be considered as a whole and all clauses taken into consideratioi, and all
uncertainties will be treated as ambiguities subject to clarification by extrinsic evidence.)
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A. Duhig82 Rule
The classic fractional-interest problem is presented by the following
situation: A grantor who owns 100 per cent of the surface but only 50 per
cent of the minerals executes a general warranty deed reserving to himself
50 per cent of the minerals, without mention of the fact that 50 per cent of
the minerals are owned by someone else. At first blush, one reading this
deed would conclude that the grantor reserved to himself the remaining 50
per cent mineral interest, but the Texas court in Duhig v. Peavy-Moore
Lumber Co.88 held that the grantor merely protected his warranty and
reserved nothing. A potential candidate for application of the Duhig rule
exists whenever a grantor who owns less than the entire mineral estate
reserves a fractional mineral or royalty interest.84
Much has been written regarding the Duhig rule, its wisdom, when it
is applicable, and the theories and reasoning upon which it is founded,8 5 but
in Montana all this is somewhat academic as the Montana court has never
had occasion to consider its adoption in this state. Although we believe the
Montana Supreme Court will adopt the doctrine when faced with the issue,
draftsmen should avoid causing the issue to be considered by drafting
language which clearly expresses the parties' intent Duhig problems can be
avoided by: (1) expressly subjecting the conveyance to all prior mineral and
royalty reservations and conveyances; and (2) by stating that either the
interest reserved is in addition to all mineral and royalty interests not
owned by the grantor, or that the interest reserved includes all interests not
owned by the grantor and will be reduced thereby.
B. Royalty Burden Allocation
A Duhig-like situation arises where a grantor who owns the surface
and 100 per cent of the minerals, subject to an outstanding royalty interest,
conveys the land by warranty deed reserving a fractional mineral interest
without reference to the outstanding royalty interest. The question is the
allocation of the burden of the royalty interest between the grantor and the
grantee. Applying Duhig, the grantor's reserved mineral interest must
bear the full burden of the outstanding royalty interest.8 6
This situation occurs frequently in Montana titles because of the
prevalence of royalty interests reserved by counties upon disposition of land
82. This rule is derived from the leading case of Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 135 Tex.
503, 144 S.W.2d 878 (1940).
83. Id.
84. See I WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 5, § 311.3.
85. E.g., Ellis, Rethinking the "Duhig" Doctrine, 28 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 947 (1983).
86. Selman v. Bristow, 402 S.W.2d 520, 524 (Tex.Civ.App. 1966), writ of error refused, 406
S.W.2d 896 (1966).
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acquired by tax sales.8 7 The consequences of the royalty-burden allocation
can be severe. Imagine the surprise of the grantor who reserves a 50 per
cent mineral interest must bear the full burden of the county royalty.
The same royalty-burden allocation problem can arise where a
mineral owner (who may or may not be the surface owner) executes a
mineral deed conveying a fractional mineral interest (which is less than all
his interest) without mention of an outstanding royalty interest. Here
again, the result is that the grantor must bear the full burden of the
outstanding royalty interest.88 Whenever there exists or possibly exists an
outstanding royalty burden, the conveying or reserving instrument should
explicitly state the desired allocation of the royalty burden. Usually a
burden allocation in proportion to the parties' interests is desired. To
simply state that the instrument or the interest conveyed or reserved is
subject to outstanding royalties is not sufficient, since this presents the
question of whether the interest is intended to bear the full royalty burden
or only a proportionate share. Proportionate allocation of the burden of
outstanding interests can be accomplished by couching the reservation or
conveyance in terms of a fraction of the mineral interest owned by the
grantor,8 9 but reliance upon this approach is not as risk-free as an express
statement of burden allocation.
C. Fraction of What?
Another fractional-interest problem is presented where an owner of
less than 100 per cent of the land (for example, 50 per cent) executes a deed
conveying "all of his right, title and interest" or and "undivided 50 per cent
interest", but reserving a fractional mineral interest (again, for example,
50 per cent) in "said land", or the "the land described", or the "the land
conveyed". The issue is whether the fractional mineral interest is applied to
the interest in the land conveyed (i.e., 50 per cent of the minerals in an
undivided 50 per cent of the land, resulting in a reserved 25 per cent
mineral interest), or to the full mineral estate.90
87. See, e.g., Amundson v. Gordon, 134 Mont. 142, 328 P.2d 631 (1958) (burden of county
royalty allocated equally between grantor and grantee on the basis of written agreement that the
mineral rights were to be divided equally).
88. See Superior Oil Co., 297 F.Supp. at 89-93 (mineral deed grantee held to have received a full
one-half mineral interest unreduced by an outstanding 6 percent county royalty); see also Selman,
402 S.W.2d at 524 (grantor in deed purporting to convey / of mineral estate without reference to prior
royalty interest held estopped from claiming that conveyed interest proportionately burdened by the
royalty).
89. See Amundson, 134 Mont. at 148, 328 P.2d at 633-34; see also Superior Oil Co., 297 F.
Supp. at 89.
90. Compare Hooks v. Neill., 21 S.W.2d 532 (Tex.Civ.App. 1929) (the interest reserved held to
be the specified fraction of the fractional interest "conveyed") with King v. First Nat'l. Bank of Wichita
Falls, 192 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. 1946) (the fractional interest reserved held to have related to the full
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Although careful reading of deeds of this type will usually result in a
conclusion that seems fairly clear, the result is often based upon how the
deed is physically arranged or upon very technical construction.91 The
likelihood of error, either in drafting or interpretation, makes it unwise for
a draftsman to rely upon the physical structure of the deed or the divining
skills of a title examiner. Rather, the scrivener should carefully and
completely describe the interest reserved (e.g., "reserving 50 per cent of all
minerals in, on and under the 50 per cent undivided interest hereby
conveyed, such that the grantor retains 25 per cent of the full mineral estate
in the described land").
D. Mineral Acres
The practice of describing the quantum of mineral interest as a
multiple of a "mineral acre" is popular among members of the natural
resources development community. A "mineral acre" is commonly under-
stood to consist of the equivalent of 100 per cent of the mineral estate in one
acre of land,9 2 and if mineral acres are used to described undivided
fractional interests in a tract, the specified number of mineral acres
becomes the numerator and the total acreage becomes the denominator of
the fractional interest.93 Thus, 20 mineral acres in a 40-acre tract
constitutes an undivided one-half mineral interest in the tract.
While conveying a specified number of mineral acres with respect to a
particular tract is an acceptable manner of conveying an undivided
interest, 4 difficulties arise from the common practice of conveying or
reserving fractional interest by means of a reference to both a specified
fraction and a specified number of mineral acres.9 If the grantor owns the
specified fractional interest in all of the acreage described, and if the total
acreage is actually equal to the acreage assumed, this practice does not
present a problem. If, however, the grantor does not own the specified
fraction in all of the described acreage, or if the tract contains more or less
than the assumed number of acres, inconsistencies are inherent.96 For
example, if a grantor purports to convey a 50 per cent mineral interest, also
described as 20 mineral acres in a 40 acre tract, but does not own any
minerals in 10 of the acres, does the grantee acquire a 50 per cent interest or
a two-thirds (20/30) interest in the 30 acres in which the grantor owns an
interest in the land).
91. See I WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 5, § 312.
92. 1 KUNTZ, supra note 8, § 16.3, at 494.
93. Krebs v. Hodgson, 274 S.2d 122, 123 (Miss. 1973).
94. Id.; I WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 5, § 320.2.
95. See, e.g., Superior Oil Co., 297 F.Supp. at 86.
96. Id.; I KUNTZ, supra note 8, § 16.3.
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interest? Similarly, if a grantor purports to convey a 50 per cent interest in
a tract assumed to contain 40 acres, and the interest conveyed is also
described as 20 mineral acres, then if it is subsequently ascertained that the
tract only contains 30 acres does the grantee take a 50 per cent interest or a
two-thirds mineral interest in the tract?97
Because incqnsistency is virtually certain, a fractional mineral inter-
est should never be expressed both as a fraction and as a specified number
of mineral acres. Moreover, acknowledging a title examiner's bias, we
suggest for the sake of simplicity and clarity that the fractional-interest
approach be used to the exclusion of the "mineral acre" concept. Frac-
tional interests are easier to understand and apply, while title to the entire
tract involved in a "mineral-acre" transaction must necessarily be ex-
amined before the effect upon any portion of the tract can be determined.
Even if the scrivener is certain of the precise number of total acres and is
also certain of the grantor's underlying title, only the fractional-interest
approach should be used.
However, many transactions are struck on the basis of mineral acres,
and in these cases a deed phrased in terms of mineral acres may best
effectuate the intent of the parties. 8 When this approach is taken, the
scrivener should resist the temptation to set forth the fraction which he
believes results. He should also avoid reciting the assumed number of total
acres, since inaccuracy in such a recital would again present an interpreta-
tion problem. If the mineral-acre approach is used, the operative instru-
ment should include a clause which states that it is the intent to convey an
undivided interest which shall be as nearly uniform as possible throughout
the tract described.
E. Royalty Fractions
The Montana case of Proctor v. Werk99 illustrates a fractional-
interest issue in the royalty arena. In Proctor, the court examined a
reservation of "six per cent of all royalties."100 Most commentators have
taken the view that there is a clear distinction between "X royalty" and X
per cent of royalty," the former entitling the owner thereof to X per cent of
all production from the land, while the latter is only X per cent of the
97. 1 KUNTZ, supra note 8, § 16.3.
98. 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 5, § 320.2. While there is justification for using the
mineral acre approach in mineral conveyances and reservations, the concept of "royalty acres" should
be completely avoided inasmuch as,"it is not at all clear what is meant by a royalty acre." 1 KUNTZ,
supra note 8, § 16.3. Fortunately, from our experience the "royalty acre" concept is rarely used in
Montana.
99. __Mont-, 714 P.2d 171 (1986).
100. Id.
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landowner's royalty reserved under a mineral lease covering the land.10 1
True to its proclivity in cases of interpretation, the Montana court
disagreed, holding the "X per cent of the royalty" is ambiguous as it may
mean X per cent of total production. The court remanded the case for
consideration of extrinsic evidence to ascertain the parties' intent.10
Thus, if the intent is to create a royalty of X per cent of the
landowner's royalty reserved in a mineral lease covering the land, the
instrument should explicitly state. The language should be expanded to
provide that the specified fraction of royalty applies to the royalty under
the existing lease and any future leases, thereby avoiding a potential
uncertainty if the existing lease provides for one royalty rate and future
leases provide for different rates. 103
Another royalty fraction problem crops up when a specified fractional
royalty is conveyed or reserved, and the grantor owns less than the full
mineral fee. The question arises as to whether the royalty fraction applies
to the full mineral interest, or only to the fractional interest owned by the
grantor.104 If there is any possibility that the grantor owns less than the full
mineral fee, the possibility of judicial review can be negated if the
controlling instrument expressly provides whether the royalty interest is
proportionately reducible.
VIII. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CONFLICTING INTERESTS
The discussion thus far has addressed a number of drafting considera-
tions with respect to defining and limiting mineral and royalty interests in
terms of the substances covered and the nature and quantum of the
interests. This section will focus on the legal relationships between the
owners of potentially conflicting interests in the same land, and the
drafting considerations with respect thereto. In each case, unless the
controlling documents expressly cover the subject, the various interest
101. Bledsoe, supra note 80, at 88; 1 KUNTZ, supra note 8, § 16.3, at 498; 2 WILLIAMS &
MEYERS, supra note 5, §§ 327, 327.1., and 327.2.
102. Proctor, __ Mont. at __, 714 P.2d at 173; see also, Close v. Ruegsegger's Estate,
143 Mont. 32, 386 P.2d 739 (1963) ("5 per cent of all oil royalties" treated as ambiguous and lower
court's determination based upon extrinsic evidence that the parties intended a royalty of 5 per cent of
all production upheld); Stokes v. Tutvet, 134 Mont. 250,328 P.2d 1096 (1 958)(involving a reservation
of "two per cent (2%) of the landowner's royalty rights").
103. 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 5, § 327.2, at 90.1-90.2. Ideally, an instrument creating
a royalty measured by lease landowner royalty should also deal with the eventuality of mineral
development by the mineral owner without a lease, but this is probably such a rare occurrence that it
may not be justifiable to interject this issue into the transaction. Since the quantum of the royalty
owner's interest is dependent upon the lease negotiated by the mineral owner, this type of royalty also
suggests the need for including safeguards to protect the royalty owner. See infra text accompanying
note 125.
104. Cf. Fry v. Farm Bureau Oil Co., 3 lll.2d 94, 119 N.E.2d 749 (1954).
[Vol. 9
SCRIVENER'S CONCERNS
owners must look to statutory and case law to determine their relative
rights and obligations. To the extent the controlling law is discernible, not
likely to change over time and is acceptable to the parties, there is little
reason to deal with the subject by agreement. If, however, the state of the
law is not clear, subject to change or not acceptable, to provide certainty as
well as to accommodate particular needs and desires of the parties to the
transaction, the instrument creating the mineral or royalty interest should
expressly set forth the relative rights and obligations as between the owner
of such interest and the owners of other interests in the same land.
A. Mineral/Surface
Immediately upon severance of the mineral estate from the surface
estate a basic conflict of interest arises. For the mineral owner to extract
minerals and realize a benefit from his estate, some amount of surface-
disturbing activity will be required. Surface disturbance, which can range
from the total surface destruction associated with strip mining to the
limited surface activity associated with oil and gas operations, will
inevitably work to the detriment of the surface owner.
The right to enter upon the surface of the land and make such use of so
much of the surface as is reasonably necessary for exploration, develop-
ment and production of minerals is an established incident of a severed
mineral estate.10 5 Although this right will be implied if the controlling
instrument is silent on the subject,10 6 the instrument which effects the
severance (or a separate agreement) can provide for relative rights
different than those which would be implied.10 7 The surface owner is not
entitled to compensation for damages resulting from the mineral owner's
exercise of his right to use of the surface,108 absent an express provision to
this effect in the conveyance or reservation severing the mineral estate, °10
or a statute dealing with the subject.1 10 The mineral owner is, however,
liable for damages to the extent his surface use is unreasonable, excessive
105. Hurley, 153 Mont. at 202,455 P.2d at 323; McDonald v. Unirex, Inc., - Mont_ ,
718 P.2d 316, 317 (1986).
106. Western Energy Co., 195 Mont. at 209, 635 P.2d at 1301.
107. Cf. Sellars v. Ohio Valley Trust Co., Inc. 248 S.W.2d 897, 898 (Ky. 1952) (construing a
deed which provided that no surface rights of privilege were conveyed); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Brennan,
385 F.2d 951, 952 (5th Cir. 1967) (mineral deed provided for the burial of pipelines and non-
interference with grazing).
108. Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 349 F.Supp. 1302,1310 (D.Mont. 1972), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom, Norther Cheyenne Tribe v. Northern Cheyenne Defandant Class of
Allottees, Heirs, Devisees, 505 F2d 268 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 425 U.S. 649 (1976);
see also Norum v. Queen City Oil Co., 81 Mont. 527, 539, 264 P. 122, 125 (1928).
109. See, e.g., Western Energy Co., 195 Mont. at 208, 635 P.2d at 1301.
110. See, e.g., MONT CODE ANN. §§ 82-10-501 through -511 (1987) (providing for the payment
of compensation to the surface owner for damages caused by oil and gas operations).
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or unnecessary, or if the damages result from negligent operations."' The
mineral owner's right of surface use does not include the right to use of the
surface in connection with mineral development and production from other
lands, and the mineral owner will be liable in the event of such use."1
2
The trend, both legislative and judicial, seems to afford surface
owners increased protection from surface-disturbing mineral exploration
and development activities. Although not yet adopted in Montana, the
doctrines of "alternative means" and "accommodation" will probably find
favor with the Montana courts. The doctrine of alternative means requires
the mineral owner to take an operational approach which is less disruptive
to the surface owner if such approach is reasonable."' The doctrine of
accommodation balances the correlative rights of the mineral and surface
owner to establish their relative rights and obligations." 4 The surface
owner is also protected by the rule of subjacent support, which entitles him
to the physical support provided by underlying mineral strata."15
The common law rule stated above regarding the absence of liability
to the mineral developer for surface damages has been altered with respect
to oil and gas operations by the Montana Surface Owner Damage and
Disruption Compensation Act of 1981.111 This Act, which applies to oil and
gas operations only, requires notice to the surface owner prior to com-
mencement of operations; obligates the oil and gas operator to compensate
the surface owner for loss of agricultural production and income, lost land
value and lost value of improvements; and provides a mechanism by which
the surface owner can initiate surface damage settlement negotiations.11
7
Although the general legal relationship between the surface owner
and a severed mineral interest owner is reasonably well established, there is
much room for contractual interface, particularly from the surface owner's
point of view. For example, even though the Montana Surface Owner
Damage and Disruption Compensation Act provides for compensation to
the surface owner for damages in the oil and gas context, the surface owner
may wish to include damage-compensation provisions with respect to all
minerals, and even enhance the protection afforded by the Act. In some
circumstances, it might be appropriate to provide detailed damage-
compensation provisions including the relevant measure of damages, the
111. See Hurley, 153 Mont. at 203,455 P.2d at 323; Norem, 81 Mont at 539-40,264 P. at 125.
112. Russell v. Texas Co., 238 F.2d 636,642 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 938 (1957).
113. See Getty oil Co. v Jones, 470 S.W. 2d 618, 621 (Tex. 1971).
114. See Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. West, 508 S.W.2d 812, 815 (Tex. 1974).
115. 6 AM. L. OF MINING § 200.02[l] [b] (1987); compare Western Energy Co., 195 Mont. at
208, 635 P.2d at 1301 (strip mining within contemplation of parties at the time of mineral severance)
with Smith v. Moore, 172 Colo. 440,444,474 P.2d 794,796 (1970) (strip mining not contemplated).
116. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 82-10-501 through -511 (1987).
117. Id. §§ 82-10-502, -503, -504, -506 and -507 (1987).
[Vol. 9
SCRIVENER'S CONCERNS
damage elements to be considered, and procedures for determining
damages.
The surface owner may wish to restrict or even preclude the mineral
owner's surface use rights. Rather than relying upon the mineral owner's
discretion as to what is reasonable and necessary, the surface owner may
want to specifically detail the extent of the mineral owner's rights. On the
other hand, the mineral owner may wish to expand the rights otherwise
held. For example, the right to use the surface for mineral development in
connection with adjacent lands may be needed.
Although the severance of the mineral estate from the surface estate is
commonplace, in most cases the relationship between the owners of each is
accorded little drafting attention. Yet, this is an extremely explosive
relationship, and one that invariable breeds contention. Consider the
situation where a party purchases the surface estate, subject to a reserva-
tion of all minerals, only to find some years later that the surface estate is
about to be destroyed completely by a strip mine."1 8 In view of the
sensitivity of this relationship, the scrivener must determine whether the
parties are satisfied with the relationship established by law, or whether
express provisions governing this relationship are appropriate for the
transactions at hand.
B. Life Tenant/Remainderman
The creation of life estates involving mineral interests, whether
severed from the surface estate or not, gives rise to conflicting interests as
mineral production by the life tenant depletes the estate to which the
remainderman will succeed. A basic issue to be addressed is whether the
life tenant can, without the consent of the remainderman and absent
express language in the creating instrument, develop and produce minerals
or grant the right to develop and produce minerals to a mineral lessee.
Generally, absent the existence of an "open" mine or well, the life tenant
does not have the right to develop and produce minerals, either personally
or through a lessee, as such would constitute waste.11 9
In contrast, the Montana Supreme Court apparantly will readily find
within the creating instrument a grant of the right to develop and produce
118. See, e.g., Western Energy Co. v. Genie Land Co., 195 Mont. 202, 635 P.2d 1297 (1981).
The Montana Legislature intervened in this relationship by requiring surface owner consent prior to
the issuance of any coal strip mining permit. MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-4-224 (1987). However, in
subsequent litigation the legislation was declared unconstitutional. Western Energy Co. v. Genie Land
Co., -Mont-., 737 P.2d 478,484 (1987). Of course, at the time of the mineral severance, the
parties could have effectively agreed that surface owner consent was required prior to strip mining.
119. Welborn v. Tidewater Associated Oil Co., 217 F.2d 509,510 (10th Cir. 1954); 1 SUMMERS,
THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 32 (1954). The extent to which the general life tenant/remainderman
rules apply to severed mineral interests is subject to question. I KUNTZ, supra note 8, § 8.6.
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minerals. In Danielson v. Danielson,'" the court held that the life tenant
had the right to produce and sell gravel where the instrument creating his
estate granted him, "the right to use [the land], as he may deem fit, and to
receive the income and proceeds" from the land."2"
However, a draftsman would be unwise to rely upon a blanket
application of Danielson. This issue should be resolved in the instrument
creating the life estate by either expressly granting or denying the life
tenant the right to develop and produce minerals and to execute mineral
leases. If the right is granted, it should explicitly include the right to grant a
lease which will survive the life tenancy, since without this right a mineral
lessee would unlikely invest the funds necessary to develop the minerals if
his rights are subject to termination at any time upon the death of the life
tenant.12 2
Assuming that the life tenant and remainderman have joined in a
mineral lease, or mineral development and production occurs on some
other basis, the next issue concerns the rights of the parties to bonuses,
rentals and royalty payments. Again, absent an "open" mine or well or
express provisions to the contrary, the general rule is that the life tenant is
entitled to rentals, but only the interest earned on bonuses and royalties,
with the principal thereof passing to the remainderman upon the termina-
tion of the life estate.123 To avoid disputes, the instrument creating the life
estate should detail the relative rights of the parties to the proceeds of
mineral development and leasing.
C. Executive/Non-Executive
The "executive" is the owner of the exclusive right to execute mineral
leases which right is one of the elements of the mineral estate. 24 For
purposes of this article, the "non-executive" is assumed to be the owner of a
royalty or non-executive mineral interest as to which the realization of a
benefit is in some manner dependent upon action of the "executive". The
creation of an executive/non-executive relationship gives rise to various
concerns.
For example, consider the creation of a royalty interest which is
measured in terms of a fraction of whatever landowner royalty is reserved
in any existing or future mineral lease.' 25 Accordingly, the extent of the
120. 172 Mont. 55, 560 P.2d 893 (1977).
121. Id. at 56, 560 P.2d at 894-95.
122. Cf. Doverspikev. Chambers, 357 Pa. Super. 539,516 A.2d 392 (1986) (involving the issue
of whether a lease executed by a life tenant survives his death).
123. R. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF OIL AND GAs LAW § 25 (1955); 1 KuNTz, supra note 8, § 8.2.
124. Stokes, 134 Mont. at 256, 328 P.2d at 1100.
125. See supra text accompanying note 103.
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royalty owner/non-executive's interest is directly dependent upon the lease
royalty negotiated by the executive. More importantly, whether the
royalty owner will realize any benefit from his interest is dependent upon
whether the executive grants a mineral lease or proceeds with mineral
development himself. Similar interdependent relationships exist between
the executive and the non-executive mineral owner.
Aside from negotiated contractual provisions, does the executive owe
any duty to the non-executive with respect to exercise of the executive
right? Although Montana has no cases on point and other jurisdictions are
not consistent, most courts that have dealt with the issue impose some sort
of a rather loosely-defined duty on the executive.126 Courts have struggled
with such problems as the duty of the executive to develop the minerals and
to protect the non-executive against drainage,127 the duty of the executive
to lease,12 8 whether the executive breaches his duty by self-dealing,"2 and
whether the executive breached his duty by negotiating for himself an
additional overriding royalty and an additional cash payment.13 0
This is an instance where the uncertainty in the law suggests the need
for express provisions either to protect the non-executive from the actions
or inactions of the executive, or to absolve the executive from liability or a
combination of both. Such provisions in the creating document can be as
simple as establishing the existence of a duty and a general statement of its
nature, e.g., a fiduciary duty, a duty of utmost fair dealing and diligence, or
a duty of ordinary care. At the other end of the spectrum, it may be
appropriate to include detailed provisions regarding the exercise of the
executive right, such as imposing obligations to protect against drainage
and to lease in a timely manner and fixing minimum requirements with
respect to lease royalty, bonuses and rentals.
Whatever the final conclusions may be, the draftsman should be
aware of the potential for conflicts and diverging interests between the
executive and non-executive, and consideration should be given to setting
126. See 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 5, § 339.2; see also Smith, Implications of a
Fiduciary Standard of Conduct for the Holder of the Executive Right, 64 TEx. L. REV. 371 (1985),
reprinted in 24 PuB. LAND & RES. L. DIG. 10 (1987)
127. Pinchback v. Gulf Oil Corp., 242 S.W.2d 242 (Tex.Civ.App. 1951).
128. Federal Land Bank of Houston v. United States, 168 F.Supp. 788, 791 (Ct.CI. 1958)
(breach of duty of "utmost fair dealing and diligence" where executive failed to timely exercise its
leasing power).
129. Manges v. Guerra, 673 S.W.2d 180, 183-84 (Tex. 1984) (breach of "fiduciary duty" of
"utmost fair dealing" where executive executed lease to himself).
130. Portwood v. Buckalew, 521 S.W.2d 904, 914-18 (Tex.Civ.App. 1975) (breach of duty of
"utmost fairness" where executives took royalties and cash payments in addition to the benefits shared
with the non-executive); see also Schroeder v. Schroeder, 133 ll.App.3d 740,747-51,479 N.E.2d 39 1,
398-99 (1985) (breach of duty based on an "ordinary and prudent landowner" test where executive
took an additional royalty for himself).
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forth guidelines to control this relationship.
D. Multiple-Mineral Development
Concurrent, but incompatible, development and extraction of dissimi-
lar mineral substances or various mineral strata owned by different parties
is rife with legal conflicts. The classic example of such a conflict is the
competing interests of oil and gas operations and coal mining.131
Unlike the well-established rules regarding the conflict between the
dominant mineral estate and the subservient surface estate, 13 2 the law with
respect to multi-mineral development conflicts between co-equal estates is
not well defined, particularly in states such as Montana where there is no
judicial precedent.3 Various theories traditionally have been utilized to
resolve these conflicts, including finding implied rights of access and
removal' 34 and finding a way of necessity."3 5 More recently, the courts have
displayed a greater degree of sophistication in approaching such problems,
turning to doctrines such as that of alternative means'36 and the doctrine of
accommodation. 3 7 Even the rudimentary concept of first-in-time, first-in-
right has been considered in this area.'3 8
Although it is undoubtedly impractical to resolve potential multiple-
mineral development conflicts in every transaction which results in diverse
ownership of different mineral substances or strata, where such conflict is
likely it is important to address these issues rather than to leave them to the
vagaries of resolution by litigation. Provisions dealing with mineral
development must be tailored to meet the particular situation, but should
include a resolution of the basic issues: (a) the right of access through other
mineral deposits; (b) the relative right to engage in conflicting or
interfering operations: (c) priority of right where operations are mutually
exclusive; (d) required accommodations; (e) precautions to be employed;
and (f) the entitlement to damages for interference, precluded operations,
lost reserves and incremental costs of concurrent operations.1 9
131. See, e.g., Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 152 Pa. 286, 25 A. 597 (1893).
132. See supra text accompanying note 105.
133. See Lear, Multiple-Mineral Development Conflicts: An Armageddon in Simultaneous
Minerals Operations?, 28 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 79, 199-209 (1982);see also Kramer, Conflicts
Between the Exploitation of Lignite and Oil and Gas: The Case for Reciprocal Accommodation, 21
HOUSTON L. REV. 49 (1984), reprinted in 22 PUB. LAND & RFs. L. DIG. 10 (1985).
134. Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 152 Pa. 286, 25 A. 597 (1893).
135. Pyramid Coal Corp. V. Pratt, 229 Ind. 648, 651-53, 99 N.E.2d 427, 430 (1951).
136. Getty Oil Co., 470 S.W.2d at 621; see supra text accompanying note 113.
137. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 508 S.W.2d at 815; seesupra text accompanying note 114.
138. See Lear, supra note 133, at 209-10; see also 6 AM. L. OF MINING § 200.04[2][d][i]
(1987).
139. See 6 AM.L. OF MINING § 200.0412][d][ii] (1987).
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E. Cotenants
Where the mineral estate is divided into undivided fractional inter-
ests, the several mineral owners are cotenants.140 Each mineral cotenant, at
least in Montana, has the non-exclusive right to enter the premises and
extract minerals without being guilty of waste.141 Moreover, each mineral
cotenant may separately lease his mineral interest and confer on the lessee
his right to extract minerals.4 2 A cotenant who extracts minerals may
charge against the proceeds the reasonable and necessary expenses of
extraction and marketing but must account to his cotenants for their share
of the net profits.' 43
The fundamental legal relationship between cotenants is fairly well
established and defined. Accordingly, this subject need not be covered in
instruments creating undivided mineral interests so long as the established
case law and statutes define a relationship acceptable to the prospective
mineral cotenants. However, there may be circumstances where the
relationship provided by law is not acceptable.
The rule that each mineral cotenant is entitled to proceed with
mineral development without the consent of other cotenants precludes one
cotenant from absolutely blocking mineral development. However, the
bare right to proceed on the basis of a fractional mineral interest is not often
economically adequate. 44 In view of the high cost of financing mineral
exploration and development and the significant risks involved, fractional
mineral interest owners are understandably disinclined to proceed with
mineral development on their own when they will be obligated to pay over a
share of the profit to cotenants who made no investment in capital and who
were subjected to no risks.
The law provides the device of involuntary partition as one potential
solution to this problem.145 In the oil and gas context, this problem has been
addressed in some states by pooling statutes which provide for the
imposition of penalties upon owners who refuse to join in the risk of
development, or provide other measures which reward the developing
140. Amundson, 134 Mont. at 149, 328 P.2d at 634.
141. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-1-311 and 70-19-202 (1987); Hochsprung v. Stevenson, 82
Mont. 222,237-38,266 P. 406,409 (1928). The Montana rule is in accord with the majority of states,
while the minority rule is that production of minerals by one cotenant constitutes actionable waste. I
KuNTz, supra note 8, §§ 5.3 and 5.4.
142. Amundson, 134 Mont. at 149, 328 P.2d at 634; Hochsprung, 82 Mont. at 238, 266 P. at
409.
143. Marias River Syndicate, 98 Mont. at 265, 38 P.2d at 602; MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-19-202
(1987); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-11-202 (1987) (provides for forced pooling of undivided
interests within an oil or gas spacing unit, the allocation of costs and the division of net proceeds).
144. 4 AM. L. OF MINING § 131.03[2] (1987).
145. 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 5, § 506.
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owner for incurring the risk of development."' Although the 1985
Montana Legislature passed provisions which provide for non-consent
penalties,1 47 the question of whether this statute will be effective to impose
non-consent penalties upon non-joining co-owners is beyond the scope of
this article. In any event, pooling statutes apply only to oil and gas
operations.
The frustration of mineral development which may result from the
fractionalization of the mineral estate into many undivided interests is
undoubtedly one of the reasons for the development of the concept of the
non-executive mineral interest. The creation of a non-executive mineral
interest rather than an undivided, fully-participating mineral interest
leaves the executive and development rights in the entire mineral estate
vested in one person. A viable alternative available when the cotenancy is
created is to include provisions designed to avoid the problems of multiple
ownership, such as forced joinder in development, nonconsent penalties, or
forfeiture for refusal to join in a proposed operation.
IX. CONCLUSION
This article is not a comprehensive catalog of all problems associated
with the creation of severed mineral and royalty interests. It is hoped,
however, that the points discussed will provide scriveners with food for
thought, and a flavor for the kinds of concerns which should receive
attention in their drafting efforts. Mineral and royalty conveyancing
requires not only word skills, but also an understanding of the nature of the
interests involved and the results desired by the parties.
Continued mineral development in Montana will undoubtedly subject
many conveyances involving mineral and royalty interests to intense
scrutiny-first by title examiners, and then, unfortunately, perhaps by the
courts. This, coupled with the tendency of the Montana Supreme Court to
seize upon any uncertainty, however slight, to declare the draftsman's
product ambiguous, and then resort to extrinsic evidence to ascertain
intent, 48 makes it imperative that the draftsman exercise extreme care
and take the time to effect the intent of the parties with clear and concise
language.
146. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-2-17 (1987).
147. 1985 Mont. Laws 694, (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-11-202 (1987)).
148. See, e.g., Adams, 182 Mont at 517,597 P.2d at 1144; Proctor, -Mont. at..... 714,
P.2d at 173; Crawford, 137 Mont. at 144-45, 351 P.2d at 225.
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